How can and should UK society adjust to dementia? by Thomas, Carol & Milligan, Christine




Carol Thomas and Christine Milligan
This paper explores the application of the 
social model of disability to dementia. This 
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social model is, and where it has come from. 
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Background
Our paper sets out to address the following themes:
• the development of conceptual/theoretical thinking – especially looking at the 
social model of disability –  and its relevance to dementia. Attention is paid to 
social diversity and equity;
• social attitudes and understanding – opportunities and barriers. Here the focus 
is on disablism and ageism – and the degree to which these overlap;
• the nature and development of services – thinking beyond the usual health 
and social care boxes – thinking spatially;
• the empowerment and involvement of people living with dementia. 
The social model of disability
A small but growing number of researchers, writers and activists have recognised 
the appropriateness and utility of applying the social model of disability to the 
experience and politics of living with dementia (Proctor, 2001; Blackman et 
al., 2003; Dorenlot, 2005; Beattie et al., 2005; Davis et al., 2009; Brittain et al., 
2010; Boyle, 2014). The JRF question ‘How can and should UK society adapt to 
dementia?’ invites social model thinking by suggesting that the responsibility to 
adjust rests with society rather than with individuals who have dementia.
The social model of disability was named by the disabled activist and writer, Mike 
Oliver (1983), in his attempt to capture the novel ideas about disability developed 
by disabled people themselves in the 1970s – especially those who formed 
the path-breaking organisation the Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation (UPIAS, 1976). Core to the novel ideas developed by Paul Hunt, 
Vic Finklestein and others in UPIAS was the proposition that disabled people 
were socially disadvantaged not by their impairments1 itself but by the negative 
responses of people deemed normal by doctors and others in authority. In this 
way, UPIAS drew attention to a form of social relationship between disabled and 
non-disabled people predicated on social inequality, a relationship that makes 
its presence felt in a number of ways: in interactions between individuals; in the 
rules and practices in social institutions like schools and hospitals; and in solidified 
structural forms such as built environments and systems of travel. This perspective 
contrasted markedly with the taken-for-granted biomedical view: that being 
impaired is an abnormality that inevitably causes major problems and limitations in 
the lives of ‘the afflicted’. It also contrasts with the commonplace pity perspective: 
that disabled people are to be pitied because their damaged bodies and minds stop 
them participating in normal activities. 
Oliver’s formulation of the social model of disability was a shorthand expression 
of the UPIAS view, and drew immediate attention to the social barriers erected by 
the non-disabled in all social arenas. Put another way, the model captured the idea 
that people with impairments are a socially oppressed group in industrial societies: 
Thus we define … disability as the disadvantage or restriction of activity 
caused by a contemporary social organisation which takes no or little 
account of people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them 
from participation in the mainstream of social activities. Physical disability is 
therefore a particular form of social oppression. (UPIAS, 1976, pp.14) 
4It was not long before people with forms of impairment other than the 
straightforwardly physical began to question their apparent exclusion from this 
UPIAS and initial social model formulation. With the subsequent development of 
the disabled people’s movement (DPM) and disability studies2 in the 1980s and 
1990s, the case was made –and won – that people who lived with sensory or 
intellectual/cognitive impairments (principally learning difficulty) were also disabled 
people because they too encountered social barriers erected/practiced by the 
‘normal’ (Barnes, 2012). Further extensions of the boundary of who counts as 
disabled have occurred in the 1990s and 2000s; people with chronic illnesses and 
mental health problems are now included in the community of disabled people 
(Walmsley, 1991; Beresford, 2002). In this way, the social model of disability is 
seen to apply to a growing proportion of the population with lifelong, acquired or 
attributed impairments, as Oliver’s more recent summary suggests:
In the broadest sense, the social model of disability is about nothing more 
complicated than a clear focus on the economic, environmental and cultural 
barriers encountered by people who are viewed by others as having some 
form of impairment – whether physical, mental or intellectual. The barriers 
disabled people encounter include inaccessible education systems, working 
environments, inadequate disability benefits, discriminatory health and social 
support services, inaccessible transport, houses and public buildings and 
amenities, and the devaluing of disabled people through negative images in the 
media – films, television, and newspapers. (Oliver, 2004, pp. 21).  
Because of its conceptual simplicity, the social model of disability soon became a 
banner headline for the DPM in the UK, and has proved its worth as an extremely 
effective tool in campaigns for disability rights since the 1980s (Campbell and 
Oliver, 1996). Achievements of particular note in the struggle for disability rights 
and anti-discrimination legislation are the Disability Discrimination Acts (1995, 
2005), the report by the last Labour Government Improving the Life Chances of 
Disabled People (Cabinet Office, 2004), and the introduction from the 1990s of 
financial arrangements designed to facilitate independent living  – namely direct 
payments and personal budgets (Pearson, 2012). Evidence for the significance 
of these developments is clearly articulated in pronouncements by the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), formed in 2007, which laid innovative 
conceptual foundations for the recent Equality Act 2010 and the follow-up 
Equality Duty, now in force in England, Scotland and Wales.
5Given this background and history, it is not surprising that people with dementia 
were eventually identified by a few researchers and activists as another set of 
disabled people to whom the social model should apply. The impairments3  and 
impairment effects4  that are associated with dementia are viewed as foundations 
upon which social barriers are erected by the non-disabled – whether this is 
done purposively or entirely innocently and in good faith. Adopting the social 
model of disability encouraged researchers to look more closely at the everyday 
experiences and perspectives of people with dementia (Blackman et al., 2003; 
Dorenlot, 2005; Beattie et al., 2005; Davis et al., 2009; Brittain et al., 2010). 
What is disappointing, however, is the relatively small number of such studies, and 
the peripheral nature of this work within disability studies. The latter no doubt 
arises from two weaknesses of note in disability studies in the last 40 years: the 
tendency to ignore or sideline older people and their particular social interests 
(Priestley, 2003), and the failure to understand and take account of the needs 
and interests of younger people (under 65 years old) with particular types of 
impairment such as dementia. These tendencies have been compounded by the 
starting point of most gerontologists, psychologists and many social scientists: 
that is, seeing dementia in strictly biomedical terms. 
However, there are a few writers and researchers in disciplines such as social 
psychology who have adopted radical perspectives on dementia. For example, 
Tom Kitwood’s (1997) ideas about personhood insist that we look at and 
recognise ‘the person with dementia’ and not focus on ‘the person with dementia’. 
This kind of approach asserts that while we cannot escape the fact that an 
individual has dementia, and that this will impact on how they act and respond 
to people, and on what they can and cannot do, the individual is not defined by 
having dementia. In other words, the personhood perspective reminds us that 
people with dementia are still thinking and feeling individuals, with different 
personal histories, experiences, likes and dislikes. This implies that we should 
respect, value and celebrate what they can do rather than define individuals by 
their dementia; to do the latter leads to the medicalisation of individuals, and their 
relegation to demented body status. 
Those writers and researchers who have applied the social model of disability to 
dementia have identified and highlighted the presence and operation of social 
barriers in the lives of people with dementia (see especially Blackman et al., 2003; 
Dorenlot, 2005; Beattie et al., 2005; Davis et al., 2009; Brittain et al., 2010). 
The impairment effects associated with dementia in individual cases – especially 
in the early, middle or late stages involved  – means that the social barriers in 
6evidence vary in the profundity of their disabling consequences. Put another way, 
impairment effects and disablism interact, with differential outcomes. 
Examples of social barriers at work among people with dementia are:
Individual attitudinal and behavioural barriers
• lack of understanding of the impairment effects that come with the stages of 
dementia on the part of some non-disabled people (e.g. formal and informal 
carers, family members, general public, young people);
• lack of sympathy and tolerance on the part of some non-disabled people;
• failure to recognise the practical difficulties faced by people with dementia 
(e.g. difficulty recognising places and people, way-finding, locating items) – 
especially in middle and late stages of dementia;
• failure to understand how easy it is for anxiety, fear and uncertainty to take 
hold in the minds of people with dementia – e.g. in unfamiliar surroundings 
and settings;  
• failure to find ways to communicate with people with dementia, especially 
where spoken language is minimal or absent; 
• failure to recognise and respond to the non-verbal ways that people with 
dementia use to try to communicate;
• misrecognition and misunderstanding of behaviours and expressions displayed 
by people with dementia – e.g. these may be wrongly attributed, in an ageist 
fashion, to ‘just being old’;
• failure to ask people with dementia what they want, how they feel, what would 
help to improve things in their lives etc., that is, treating them as passive and 
dependent;
• cruelty, violence and abuse directed at people with dementia;
• lack of respect, dignity and compassion – at all life stages, including during end 
of life care.
Barriers that become embedded in institutional and collective practices
• failure to design or adapt items, interiors, buildings, and external environments 
like streets and gardens, to support people with dementia enabling them to 
remain active, engaged and comfortable. This requires consultation with users, 
careful planning, flexibility and the creative use of technology;
• denial of choice, self-determination and citizenship rights (e.g. around food, 
expressions of sexuality, lifestyle); 
7• failure to help get an early diagnosis of dementia because of the social stigma 
and fear attached to it;
• weaknesses and failures in medical treatments (e.g. inappropriate use of 
neuroleptic drugs), poor health and social care systems – statutory and 
voluntary;
• failure by some services to support the needs of family and other informal 
carers of people with dementia; 
• stigmatising and degrading images and representations of people with 
dementia in the media and wider culture (newspapers, film, television, theatre, 
art, literature etc);
• inadequate or absent state legislation and official policies in the interests of 
people with dementia.
It is a hallmark stance of disability studies and disability rights politics that disabled 
people must have every opportunity to be self-determining (Campbell and Oliver, 
1996). This means that their voices, however expressed, must be heard and 
facilitated. The empowerment and involvement of people living with dementia 
in their own life circumstances and choices should be paramount, and advocacy 
should respect this starting point. It follows that despite the many challenges 
presented by dementia and its impairment effects, non-disabled people need 
to find innovative and imaginative ways to make rights a reality for people with 
dementia (see for example Mental Health Foundation, 2015).
Adding theoretical weight to the social model perspective
Applying the social model of disability to living with dementia has certainly been 
an innovative and informative move, but there are inevitably limitations because 
the social model is not a theory of disability. Mike Oliver and other leading social 
modellists have made this point repeatedly: the social model of disability is only a 
model: 
… the social model of disability is... not a substitute for social theory, a 
materialist history of disability nor an explanation of the welfare state (Oliver, 
1996, pp.  41). 
Vic Finkelstein (2001, pp. 6) has added, with regret: ‘Sadly a lot of people have 
come to think of the social model of disability as if it were an explanation, 
definition or theory, and many people use the model in a rather sterile formalistic 
way’. So, while the social model of disability serves as a powerful banner headline 
8for campaigns, as a strong organising principle for disability politics, and as an 
effective framework for identifying social barriers, it does not theorise disability. 
Another way of putting this is that the social model is an effective starting point 
but lacks explanatory power: we need to be able to explain why social barriers 
come into existence in the lives of people who have types of impairment – 
including dementia. 
In essence, the key theoretical question is as follows: Why is it that the social 
relationship between people with and without impairments is one that involves 
the social oppression of the former by the latter? This is a very difficult question 
to answer – as are the parallel questions in older branches of equality and 
diversity studies: why does sexism exist? why racism? why homophobia? These 
observations suggest that the study of dementia and disability necessitate paying 
attention to some of the theoretical work underway within disability studies. At 
this point, it is useful to introduce and define the concept disablism – because this 
attempts to capture the social relationship that underpins social barriers:
Disablism: refers to the social imposition of avoidable restrictions on the life 
activities, aspirations and psycho-emotional well-being of people categorised as 
‘impaired’ by those deemed ‘normal’. Disablism is social-relational in character 
and constitutes a form of social oppression in contemporary society – alongside 
sexism, racism, ageism, and homophobia. As well as being enacted in person-
to-person interactions, disablism may manifest itself in institutionalised and 
other socio-structural forms. (Thomas 2010, pp. 37).
Explaining disabling barriers: theoretical perspectives 
Writers and researchers in disability studies have turned to a variety of social 
theories to find answers to questions about the existence of disablism. As in 
any other field, different theoretical perspectives have provided contrasting 
explanations of disablism. In summary, the two overarching theoretical 
frameworks in use in disability studies are as follows (see Thomas, 2007):  
Theories based on principles in philosophical realism (or materialism)
These include ideas advanced by key members of UPIAS and the work of 
subsequent writers who usually characterise themselves as belonging to one of 
the following traditions: Marxists, materialists, critical realists, feminist materialists 
(not an exclusive list). 
9Building on the ideas of disability activists, materialist scholars have theorised 
disability and disablism as outcomes of the way fundamental activities are 
organised in society – especially, but not exclusively, activities in the economic 
domain in the industrial era. In their view, the roots of the social marginalisation 
and spatial segregation of people with impairments are located in the historical 
development of capitalist commodity production and exchange. These socio-
economic developments gave rise to social relationships between ‘the normal’ 
and ‘the impaired’ that systematically disadvantaged and disempowered the 
latter. The foundations were laid for medicalised systems of ‘treatment and 
care’ that subjected disabled people to professional control and enforced 
dependency, first in institutional regimes and later in systems of ‘community 
care’. These perspectives have also unleashed a great deal of research detailing 
the social exclusion of disabled people in all social arenas in the contemporary 
era. Materialists have been sensitive, however, to the charge that their approach 
ignores or attaches insufficient significance to the role that cultural practices 
and processes play in shaping disablism. Their response has been to insist that 
attitudes, discourses and ideological representations are critical to disablism, 
though there is an insistence that these are materialised through the social 
practices required to meet basic needs. (Thomas, 2007, pp.  81). 
Theories based on ideas about phenomena (idealism) 
These perspectives came to prominence in disability studies later (1980s 
onward) – following what is known as the cultural turn in the social sciences more 
generally. The ideas of the social philosopher Foucault have been particularly 
influential (see Corker and Shakespeare, 2002; Tremain, 2005). Writers in this 
broad theoretical tradition usually characterise themselves as one of the following: 
poststructuralists, postmodernists, feminist postmodernists, queer theorists, anti-
foundationalists (not an exclusive list):
[These writers] have found poststructuralist theoretical perspectives, 
particularly Foucauldian and feminist variants, to be of [great] interest and 
utility. The cultural, the discursive, and the linguistic have assumed pre-
eminence in poststructuralist theorisations of disability and impairment. 
Materialist perspectives are dismissed as modernist grand narratives – systems 
of thought imbued with conceptual dualisms: abnormal/ normal, disabled/non-
disabled. The deconstruction of such [dualist] thinking comes to the forefront. 
Many faults are found with the social model of disability – the offspring of the 
UPIAS materialist interpretation of disability, with a key failing purported to 
reside in the model’s impairment/disability distinction. This, it is argued, merely 
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replicates the problematic modernist biology/society dualism. Poststructuralists 
have interrogated the category ‘impairment’, and set about exposing what they 
see as its entirely socially constructed character. (Thomas, 2007, pp. 81). 
If we apply these two theoretical perspectives to the relationship between people 
with dementia and so-called ‘normal’ members of society (i.e. between the 
disabled and non-disabled), we arrive at contrasting explanations of the disablism 
and social barriers that have come into existence in the lives of people with 
dementia. In essence:
• Materialist perspectives would highlight the way that capitalist economies have 
no use for the cognitively impaired, especially if they are old. This is because 
criteria of being socially valued are closely tied up with being able to work 
for wages/salaries (now or in the future) – particularly being able to fit into 
economic roles that generate profit. People who cannot work are therefore 
(in crude terms): excluded from the mainstream; warehoused; kept alive using 
minimal social resources; placed under the ‘legitimate’ control of doctors and 
‘carers’; kept out of the way of essential social activities etc. The category 
‘older people with dementia’ combines two disadvantaged groups in capitalist 
economies – the cognitively impaired and the old. This means that old people 
with dementia are especially vulnerable to disablism. 
• Poststructuralist perspectives would highlight the cultural meanings that attach 
to particular body types and behaviours. The bodies and behaviours of people 
with dementia carry negative cultural meanings in our society – a society that 
values youth, beauty and celebrity. The negative meanings associated with 
having dementia, especially in its middle and late stages, include ‘abnormal’, 
‘undesirable’, and ‘weird’ – even ‘disgusting’. These cultural meanings stem 
from systems of knowledge (‘discourses’) that come to have authority in 
society. Such authoritative systems of knowledge are those that are specialist 
and influential, and these in turn give social power to those that possess the 
knowledge: knowledge is power. In recent centuries, the institutions and 
groups that have maintained or acquired social power via their specialist 
knowledge include: dominant establishment faiths and churches, judiciary, 
state officials, scientists, and doctors. In matters of impairment and disease, it is 
members of the medical profession who hold power; their specialist scientific 
knowledge about dementia and other conditions allows them to define and 
treat abnormalities of body and mind, and to oversee regimens of treatment 
and ‘care’. Medical ideas are then able to shape thinking in other cultural 
institutions (e.g. the media) and inform knowledge in the wider society. In 
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this way, everyone starts to share and elaborate ideas about what it means 
to be ‘demented’ ‘mentally abnormal’, ‘mad’, and ‘dangerous’. Such cultural 
ideas seem to justify shutting people up in institutions, controlling ‘difficult 
behaviours’ through medical or pharmaceutical solutions and ignoring what 
they say. In addition, studies by poststructuralists are particularly interested in 
the genealogy (the historical development) of key ideas and categories – for 
example, the category ‘dementia’ in the medical lexicon.
If we look again at the social barriers listed above, we can see that explanations 
for the existence of these barriers will vary considerably depending on which 
theoretical stance one starts from. Perhaps of greater significance for this paper 
are the consequences that follow if one thinks through ‘how can we dismantle the 
barriers?’ 
• The materialist theoretical stance suggests that changes need to begin in the 
economic realm. Changes will then follow on in other societal domains.
• The postmodernist stance suggests that changes need to begin in the cultural 
realm – that is, in the realm of ideas and knowledge. Changes are then likely to 
follow on in other societal domains.   
Intersectionality and psycho-emotional disablism 
In this section we consider two concepts that have become important in 
theoretical work and political thinking in disability studies today. These concepts 
are intersectionality and psycho-emotional disablism, and are introduced here 
because they are particularly helpful in thinking through the social features of 
living with dementia.
Intersectionality and ‘difference’
Intersectionality is a term originally developed by feminist theorists in their 
attempt to understand the consequences of the overlapping fragments of 
our identities: our gender, ethnicity, sexuality, age and social class (see McCall, 
2005; Walby et al., 2012; Bilge, 2010). These many fragments remind us not 
to homogenise categories, such as: ‘the disabled’ or ‘the old’. Matters of social 
diversity and multiple inequality come to the fore when we look at individuals’ 
biographies and how their characteristics interact to shape life chances and 
capacities to resist disadvantage and social oppression. In disability studies, some 
researchers have used the concept of intersectionality to look at how disablism, in 
its many forms of expression, can have a differential impact on people depending 
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on their simultaneous vulnerability to sexism, ageism, racism and homophobia 
(Bê, 2012; Stienstra, 2012). For example, it you have middle stage dementia and 
are female, old and ‘poor’ you may be more vulnerable to aspects of disablism 
and other faces of oppression (sexism, ageism etc) than if you have middle stage 
dementia but are male, under 65 years old and from a professional background. 
Some more affluent people, and their families, are more likely to have access 
to resources that can protect a person with dementia from some of the social 
barriers listed above. There is nothing certain or automatic about this for 
individuals, but there will be social patterns associated with intersectionality that 
connect with degrees of vulnerability to disablist social barriers at early, middle 
and late stages of dementia. 
The interaction of disablism and ageism is obviously of particular importance 
in this paper. For example, the impairment effects in early stage dementia are 
commonly short-term memory loss and difficulty making decisions but these can 
often be attributed to ‘just being old’ in a society imbued with ageist attitudes. For 
many people with dementia there is a twofold discrimination underway – one of 
ageism and one of disablist stigma attached to behaviours that appear to signal 
mental illness. An older person is often stereotyped and reduced to an ageing 
body that is devoid of sex, gender, class, cultural knowledge etc., and this can be 
reinforced by staff practices and the interior design and layout of institutions 
such as hospitals and residential care settings. How many care homes have double 
rooms to enable a husband and wife to live together? Are same-sex couples even 
on the radar? Further, with the exception of the very few faith-based care homes 
in the UK, cultural needs are largely ignored because the focus is on body care. 
For those with dementia – who are often less able to vocalise their preferences, 
needs and desires – others often fail to consider the former’s person-centred 
needs, and think they have the right to make decisions on behalf of the person 
with dementia. Gilleard et al., (2005) argue however that taking a social model of 
disability approach to dementia means that those around people with dementia 
can review the impact that they, as ‘non-demented’ people, can have on others; 
can reconsider the value of hearing and responding to personal experience and 
can focus on abilities rather than losses.
Psycho-emotional disablism 
Another useful theoretical concept for understanding some of the social barriers 
that confront people with dementia is psycho-emotional disablism (Thomas, 
1999). This concerns the intended or unintended hurtful words, behaviours and 
social actions of non-disabled people in inter-personal engagements with people 
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with dementia. There are several examples of psycho-emotional disablism listed as 
social barriers above; one example is: lack of sympathy and tolerance on the part 
of some non-disabled people.
The presence of psycho-emotional disablism means that in addition to coping with 
the impairment effects that dementia brings, people living with the condition have 
to put up with the insults and emotional damage inflicted by non-disabled people. 
Put another way, this is a form of disablism that works along psychological and 
emotional pathways. This psycho-emotional disablism can impact negatively on 
self-esteem, personal confidence, and sense of security. Indeed, disabled people 
can be made to feel worthless, useless, of lesser value, ugly and burdensome 
(Thomas, 1999; Reeve, 2002, 2006). In this way, psycho-emotional disablism 
places further limits on who people can be by shaping individuals’ ‘inner worlds’, 
sense of ‘self’, and social behaviours. Moreover, impairments may themselves be 
affected in problematic ways by the impact of psycho-emotional disablism. For 
example, a mother whose early stage dementia causes her to be forgetful may 
have this trait worsened by an adult son who displays his frustration and keeps on 
complaining about his mother’s loss of memory. 
Services and spaces/places
There is currently a great deal of public interest in dementia in the UK – as 
the so-called burden of the costs of caring for an ageing population with 
‘high support needs’ occupies the minds of politicians and policy-makers (see, 
for example, The Prime Ministers Challenge on Dementia (DoH, 2012); the 
Alzheimer’s Society Report, 2014; National Audit Office, 2010; Quality Outcomes 
for People with Dementia: Building on the work of the National Dementia 
Strategy, 2010). We do not have the space here to critically review the reports 
on services and strategy published in recent years, but it is informative and telling 
to look at one authoritative document published in 2012: the World Health 
Organization’s report Dementia: A Public Health Priority. This global report, one 
that is likely to have an impact on governments and policy-makers internationally, 
flags up the patterns of ageing across the world – in both wealthy and low-
income countries:
Prevalence and incidence projections indicate that the number of people 
with dementia will continue to grow, particularly among the oldest old, and 
countries in demographic transition will experience the greatest growth. The 
total number of people with dementia worldwide in 2010 is estimated at 35.6 
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million and is projected to nearly double every 20 years, to 65.7 million in 
2030 and 115.4 million in 2050. The total number of new cases of dementia 
each year worldwide is nearly 7.7 million, implying one new case every four 
seconds. (WHO 2012: 2)
It is worthy of note that this report makes only passing reference to 
recognising the rights of people with dementia, and of working to maintain 
their independence, dignity, identity and personhood. Rather, the report frames 
dementia – and by implication those living with dementia – as a social, economic 
and health burden on society. Passing reference is certainly made to addressing 
widespread fear of dementia, to the stigma attached to dementia, and to the 
need to develop a ‘dementia friendly society’ – but there is little said about 
how this might be actively achieved. Hope is raised when reference is made to 
the relevance of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with 
Disabilities (CRPD, 2006) but, overall, the report takes a medicalised approach 
to dementia that is couched in terms of disease burden, treatment, risk, service 
provision and the needs of carers. From a disability rights perspective, the report 
leaves the reader with a disappointing sense of déjà vu. 
Dementia and place B head
As noted above, adapting the social model of disability and anti-disablist thinking 
to people with dementia requires us to think not just about the social and 
institutional disadvantage that those with dementia can experience, but also about 
the ways in which this is played out through the everyday places they inhabit. 
Those with dementia can lose a sense of time and space, making formerly familiar 
places unfamiliar and frightening, for example wandering through known streets 
at night. A standard institutionalised response to these impairment effects is to 
view these as ‘risky behaviours’ , the ‘treatment’ for which is confinement to the 
home or a residential setting unless accompanied by a ‘responsible adult’. Of 
course, it would be dangerous to place vulnerable people in potentially harmful 
situations, but an anti-discriminatory perspective points instead to the need 
to develop accepting communities (Dunn, 1999; Beresford et al., 2011). This 
challenge has more recently been taken up through a focus on the development 
of the Dementia Friendly Communities programme – spearheaded by the 
Alzheimer’s Society and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in 2012. This initiative 
is designed to work collaboratively with people affected by dementia and key 
partners to improve inclusion and quality of life for those living with dementia. 
A key vision of this strategy is that it will support the development of enabling 
environments, so people within these communities will better understand and be 
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supportive of people with dementia; enhancing inclusion and enabling people with 
dementia to maintain greater independence and have greater choice and control 
over their lives. 
This approach was originally developed to counter the exclusion of people 
stigmatised by poor mental health. For Dunn, this not only required a greater 
understanding of the relationship between the individual and the wider 
community, but also insisted that we look at how society judges the value of 
individuals and responds to mental ill-health. It requires asking how ‘risk’ should 
be defined, and what is meant and understood by the participation and the 
empowerment of individuals within a community. Understanding and valuing 
differences can only be resolved through the engagement of all involved. 
With regard to dementia, these practices would be based not just on a wider 
understanding of the changing behaviour patterns that occur with dementia but 
on developing caring communities that are supportive and accepting of social 
difference. For example, knowing that ‘Mrs Smith’ has dementia and may be 
confused about time and space means that we recognise the challenges she faces 
and watch out for her, rather than viewing her behaviour as deviant and her family 
as somehow failing in their duty to care. Moreover, it means working out ways of 
helping her to avoid potential dangers, or recognising that she may need support 
getting to where she wants to go. 
Developments in technology – such as personalised tracking devices – may 
enable people with dementia and their carers to identify ‘safe spaces’ within the 
community. A feeling of safety in space/place allows a person with dementia to 
move around comfortably, enabling them to retain a sense of independence that 
may otherwise be denied (Milligan, 2009). Critically, however, these technologies 
rely on local networks of support to be effective (Roberts et al., 2012). In other 
words, they rely on having local family or members of the community who are 
willing and able to respond when an alarm is triggered; that is, an accepting 
community is one that recognises the challenges and is willing to support this kind 
of innovation. 
Where care and support for people with dementia takes place, and the nature 
of those places, is important. The short-term memory loss associated with 
dementia means that new and unfamiliar places can add to the confusion already 
experienced by an individual with dementia. Supporting those with dementia to 
stay within their own homes for as long as possible is key to helping them to 
maintain a sense of self and identity. The presence of familiar objects within the 
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home – private possessions, photographs and so on – represents what Augè 
(1995) referred to as ‘anthropological space’, where the long-term memory 
provides a sense of safety; familiar visual cues can help the individual with 
dementia to more successfully negotiate that space, so extending their ability 
to self-help (Milligan, 2003). As a visual manifestation of a person’s identity and 
personhood, the home places limits on the extent to which an individual can 
be objectified and depersonalised – something that often happens in collective 
institutional settings. 
Conclusion 
We hope to have shown that applying the social model of disability to living with 
dementia results in some important insights and observations. Light is also thrown 
on the way that disablism overlaps with ageism in society, and on how space and 
place acquire special relevance. Attention has also been drawn to the necessity of 
uncovering the theoretical perspectives that help to explain the social barriers that 
the social model of disability highlights in the lives of people with dementia. This, 
in turn, has directed the focus toward useful concepts such as intersectionality 
and psycho-emotional disablism. This Viewpoint paper sets out approaches to 
dementia that are at odds with conventional thinking in official and medical 
circles. We hope that this will stimulate debate about new ways forward in both 
understanding and meeting the needs of the growing number of people living 
with dementia.  
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Notes 
1  The Work Health Organization (WHO) defines impairments as: significant deviations 
or loss of body functions and body structures (including psychological function). This 
is part of the WHO’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health 
(ICF) See: www.who.int/classifications/icf/en/.  Refer to note 4 below on the concept 
‘impairment effects’.
2  Disability Studies is the academic wing of the Disabled People’s Movement in the UK. 
This academic discipline now has a strong presence in the university sector across the 
globe. 
3  In terms of impairment, the definition of dementia in use here is as follows, from 
the WHO Report on Dementia (WHO, 2012, pp. 7). ‘Dementia is a syndrome due 
to disease of the brain – usually of a chronic or progressive nature – in which there 
is disturbance of multiple higher cortical functions, including memory, thinking, 
orientation, comprehension, calculation, learning capacity, language, and judgement. 
Consciousness is not clouded. The impairments of cognitive function are commonly 
accompanied, and occasionally preceded, by deterioration in emotional control, social 
behaviour, or motivation. This syndrome occurs in a large number of conditions 
primarily or secondarily affecting the brain. Alzheimer’s disease is the most common 
form of dementia and possibly contributes to 60–70 per cent of cases. Other major 
contributors include vascular dementia, dementia with Lewy bodies, and a group 
of diseases that contribute to frontotemporal dementia. The boundaries between 
subtypes are indistinct and mixed forms often co-exist.  Dementia affects each person 
in a different way, depending upon the impact of the disease and the person’s pre-
morbid personality. The problems linked to dementia can be understood in three stages:
 •   early stage – first year or two; middle stage – second to fourth or fifth years; late 
stage – fifth year and after. These periods are given as an approximate guideline only 
– sometimes people may deteriorate more quickly, sometimes more slowly. It should 
be noted that not all persons with dementia will display all the symptoms.  
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4  Carol Thomas (1999) introduced the concept impairment effects in Disability Studies – 
now widely used in the discipline – defined as follows: ‘Impairment effects: the direct and 
unavoidable impacts that “impairments” (physical, sensory, intellectual, emotional) have 
on an individual’s embodied functioning in the social world. Impairments and impairment 
effects are always bio-social and culturally constructed in character, and may occur at 
any stage in the life course.’ (Thomas, 2010, pp. 37). It is important that impairment 
effects are not mistaken for the restrictions and limitations in individuals’ lives that 
are actually caused by disablism. The WHO Report on Dementia usefully sets out the 
impairment effects associated with dementia in a ‘common symptoms’ table (WHO, 
2012, pp.  7). 
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